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Hi Tim,
Thanks for your answer, I waited a bit, to see if there were other ideas
as well. Seems not. :-)
Do you perhaps have a github or something, that I could check as an
inspiration to see how you connected slurm & lustre & Hashicorp Vault to
each other?
Thanks!
On 10/31/26 11:47, Cutts, Tim wrote:
> I would use a proper secret store for this. Hashicorp Vault or
> something similar. That's what we use for secret management across most
> of our HPC and HPC-adjacent services.
>
> For those more in bed with AWS you could use AWS Secrets Manager
>
> Tim
>
> *From: *sacawulu via slurm-users <slurm-users@lists.schedmd.com>
> *Date: *Saturday, 31 October 2026 at 10:26
> *To: *slurm-users@schedmd.com <slurm-users@schedmd.com>
> *Subject: *[slurm-users] Native Lustre encryption with Slurm: loading
> the key at job time without storing it on the remote network
>
> This Message Is From an External Sender
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> Hi all, I’m new to this list, so hello to everyone. :-) Goal We want to
> use native lustre client-side encryption (fscrypt) to protect data on a
> remote HPC cluster, and run Slurm jobs that can work with that data.
> Current (not so good) concept: The key would temporarily live on the
> remote network: Key on NFS: /home/username/enc.key Encrypted data on
> Lustre: /lustre/project The workflow would be: 1. A Slurm prolog loads
> the key into the kernel keyring on the compute nodes. 2. The same script
> deletes enc.key from the remote network. 3. The job runs with access to
> the decrypted data. 4. A Slurm epilog script removes the key from the
> node’s keyring. The obvious problem: Until the job is scheduled, the key
> and the encrypted data are on the same remote network, which defeats
> much of the purpose. Accepted risks We are aware of other attack
> vectors: remote admins can read enc.key on NFS, and the key can be read
> from RAM while the job runs. Strict ACLs are essential, and we run the
> computes --exclusive We accept these risks for now. Question Does anyone
> know a way to avoid storing enc.key on the remote network before the job
> starts? Can the key be 'injected' at job start from our side (pushed or
> pulled) Does slurm have any native mechanism to deal with this? Is there
> a better pattern for this? Have you implemented something like this on
> your site, and how? Note: we have an existing site-to-site ipsec tunnel
> that we could use. Any tips or experiences are welcome. Thanks! --
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